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The UK needs monetary policy to be as expansionary as
possible and this isn’t going to happen under the current
system
In the run up to the Autumn Statement, with commentators focusing on fiscal announcements
likely to be made by the Chancellor, Simon Wren-Lewis argues that it is in fact radical
thinking on monetary policy that the UK currently needs.
Wednesday will be Autumn Statement day in the UK: one of  the two times a year the
Chancellor makes big f iscal announcements. Yet this post will not be about f iscal policy:
current policy looks too much like rearranging the deck chairs, and so I will just be repeating
myself  in saying that the strategy is all wrong. Instead this post is about monetary policy.
How come – that is the MPC at the Bank of  England surely? I think not – they are just rearranging the
deck chairs too. The big picture on UK monetary policy is down to the Chancellor.
The MPC’s mandate, set by the Chancellor, is to hit 2% f or CPI inf lation ‘within a reasonable time period’.
In the past I and others thought the phrase reasonable time period would allow the MPC in practice to
minimise a combination of  excess inf lation and the output gap, which is what most macroeconomists
assume monetary policy is all about. I think this was true, within limits. In the UK these limits were
surpassed f ollowing the Great Recession, where we had a large negative output gap but above target
inf lation. We are at the ZLB, and have had Quantitative Easing (QE), because the MPC looked at the
output gap as well as inf lation, and thought that a large output gap would mean inf lation would come
tumbling down. It did not, so now they are just targeting CPI inf lation (and rather conservatively at that).
What we need is f or UK monetary policy to be as expansionary as it can be, and we are not going to get
that under the current system, even with a new man running the Bank. I have talked to enough MPC
members to know that they take the mandate they are given very seriously. They certainly believe they do
not have the discretion to f ollow a dif f erent strategy while still paying lip service to the current set up.
The system can only be changed by the Chancellor. Now some would like him to move to nominal GDP
targets, and I’d be happy with that. However I cannot see him doing that overnight: the move to include
output and go f rom changes to levels is probably too much f or something that is not widely discussed in
the UK . The best we can hope f or (and hope is the word) is f or him to launch some kind of  inquiry into
this (and other) possibilit ies – I have suggested in the past that the Treasury Select Committee could do
this.
So f or the next year or two we are almost certainly stuck with inf lation targeting. He could announce an
increase in the inf lation target, which he has the discretion to do as part of  the current system. But he
will not, because it plays terribly in terms of  polit ics. As Noah Smith laments, what we as economists
understand as inf lation is not what everyone else understands by inf lation. The number of  people in the
UK who would be prepared to def end raising the current CPI inf lation target to 4% (which I would) is
probably less than the number of  economics departments in the UK.
However, why not change the measure of  inf lation being targeted? The GDP def lator is the obvious
alternative, but there is a better candidate if  the aim is produce a signif icant but temporary rise UK
inf lation (and thereby to start a proper recovery in UK output). My suggestion is that 2% CPI inf lation is
replaced by a target f or 4% growth in average earnings. In normal t imes 4% earnings growth and 2% CPI
inf lation would be quite compatible (because real wages grow with productivity), but currently average
weekly earnings inf lation is below 2% [1]. So moving wage inf lation f rom 2% to 4% is a real challenge f or
monetary policy. To help with this challenge, the Chancellor could at the same time sanction unlimited QE,
and could suggest this goes beyond just buying gilts.
If  monetary policy still has some power despite the ZLB, then this move would have a signif icant ef f ect in
reducing real interest rates. It would also play well polit ically. “In the last f ew years hard working f amilies
have seen the real value of  their earnings f all, as wage growth has been held back while the Bank of
England has f ailed to keep consumer price inf lation on target. It is t ime that we changed things so that
the rewards f rom working increased rather than decreased over t ime. That is why I am announcing today
….” Rhetoric that is nonsense in terms of  economics, but no worse than much of  the rhetoric the
government currently uses.
Now of  course plenty of  people will complain that this is returning us to the 1970s, losing all the gains in
inf lation credibility that we have caref ully built up etc etc. But their arguments can be easily countered. If
CPI inf lation does rise, this helps get round the ZLB, and so should stimulate a recovery. Yet it cannot
‘open the f loodgates’, because all that has happened is that the def init ion of  the inf lation target has
been changed. There is no f urther change in def init ion that can lead to yet higher inf lation. In the longer
term 4% wage inf lation is pretty compatible with 2% price inf lation, unless you believe that UK
productivity growth can never grow again at levels that were thought normal bef ore the recession. Finally
I do not think there is anything in the academic literature which says that the CPI index is a signif icantly
better measure to target than an earnings index.
In an ideal world, would I be suggesting this change? Almost certainly not. Do I think it is better than
nominal GDP targeting? Probably not. However, we are not in an ideal world, and we need some action
right now. Otherwise there is a great danger that we continue down a road of  self - f ulf illing pessimism,
with all the misery and loss of  resources that this entails.
[1] That  wage inf lat ion is current ly well behind price inf lat ion plus underlying productivity
growth is not  just  a UK phenomenon – it  applies in the US and Eurozone as well. To that
extent  this proposal is not  just  of  relevance to the UK, although elsewhere central banks
have the power to make this change, whereas in the UK they do not.
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